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Abstract 
The Main Street Lending Program (MSLP) was established by the Federal Reserve to provide 
loans to small and mid-sized firms and large below-investment-grade firms that were 
financially sound before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The program, which was 
established under the Fed’s Section 13(3) emergency authorities, is supported by capital 
from the U.S. Treasury and became operational in July 2020; however, utilization has been 
slight. We describe the economic challenges in designing a loan support program and 
evaluate the MSLP program in terms of how it manages significant asymmetric information, 
adverse selection, poor targeting, and moral hazard problems while protecting taxpayer 
funds. We contrast the MSLP with other possible approaches, such as subsidies or loan 
guarantees.  We conclude by recommending changes to the program to increase its usage 
and effectiveness.          
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Unlike the 2008 financial crisis, the current economic crisis brought on by the COVID-19 
pandemic reflects fundamental cash-flow problems for many businesses as revenues have 
almost completely stopped. Businesses will need substantial financial resources—from 
previous saving, direct government grants, or credit—to pay bills, survive the shutdown, and 
be ready to rehire workers quickly and restart spending. Extending credit can help some 
businesses manage the near-term shortfall in revenues, restructure operations, and prevent 
unnecessary failures at a time when bankruptcies will be costly.  
The Main Street Lending Program (MSLP) was set up to provide loans to small and mid-sized 
firms and large below-investment-grade firms that were financially sound before the onset 
of the pandemic. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act authorizes 
the Federal Reserve to establish the program under its emergency authorities with capital 
provided by the U.S. Treasury.1 However, the MSLP is a big step for the Federal Reserve, and 
a difficult one. Lending to risky firms is a significant challenge given U.S. aversion to 
government equity stakes in private businesses and the Fed’s legal requirements to be 
secured to its satisfaction and to lend only to solvent firms.  
The program was announced in April and was revised twice in response to feedback. It 
opened for business in July, but as of mid-September 2020 had extended less than $2 billion 
of loans.2 Domestic borrowers with fewer than 15,000 employees and less than $5 billion in 
2019 revenue are eligible to apply for loans under the program. Loans are made by banks, 
and the banks retain 5 percent of the loan and sell the remaining 95 percent to one of three 
Main Street facilities—the New Loan Facility, the Priority Loan Facility, and the Expanded 
Loan Facility. (See table 4 below for details.) These facilities vary by the type of loan they 
accept, determined mainly by loan size, borrower leverage, and whether the loan is new or 
expands an existing loan. All Main Street loans have a five-year maturity, defer interest 
payments for one year, defer principal payments for two years, can be prepaid without 
penalty, and have a loan rate of LIBOR plus three percentage points. Borrowers commit to 
limits on executive compensation, shareholder distributions, and employment.  
Small-to-mid-sized businesses that could borrow from the Main Street program are an 
important part of the economy. There are more than 111,000 firms with between 100 and 
10,000 employees (Census Bureau, 2017), and they employ 48 million people, about 38 
percent of the aggregate private workforce. These firms are more reliant on loans than public 
bond markets, and some are too large for the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)3 which 
 
1 See the descriptions of the programs at     
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mainstreetlending.htm. 
2 The Federal Reserve publishes data on the use of its lending programs weekly on its H.4.1 Statistical Release.  
In recent weeks, the total volume of outstanding loans under the Main Street program has been about $2 billion. 
3 The Paycheck Protection Program was established by the CARES Act to provide funding to small and medium-
sized businesses. As of August 8, 2020, the program had lent $525 billon to 5.2 million borrowers. Loans can 
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provides SBA-guaranteed loans with possible forgiveness, or are too risky for programs 
established by the Treasury and Fed to support investment-grade corporations that issue 
commercial paper and corporate bonds. 
The Main Street program will only succeed if it actually provides credit directly to borrowers 
in need. The mere announcement that Main Street loans are available cannot provide the 
same support to the loan market as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) does for 
the commercial paper market and the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) 
does for the corporate bond market. The CPFF and the PMCCF offer credit to high-rated firms 
that have recently issued commercial paper, or that issue in the corporate bond and 
syndicated loan markets. By ensuring these firms access to credit even at a higher-than-
normal market rate, they reduce rollover risk, and risk spreads in the markets, even before 
any firms access the facilities. By contrast, because the potential borrowers under the MSLP 
differ widely in credit quality, the program cannot provide a guaranteed backstop, and so 
does not ease credit conditions broadly.  
The Main Street program purchases loan participations from banks, rather than providing 
low-cost funds to banks or providing loan guarantees. It is designed to encourage banks to 
make loans they might not make on their own, primarily by easing balance sheet constraints 
rather than offsetting banks’ reduced willingness to take risks. We describe the economic 
challenges in designing a loan support program and evaluate the Main Street program in 
terms of how it manages significant asymmetric information, adverse selection, poor 
targeting, and moral hazard problems while protecting taxpayer funds. The calibration of 
design features requires a difficult balance, and banks and businesses have shown little 
interest in the program thus far.4 Banks generally say that MSLP program loans are loans 
they would make anyhow. Potential borrowers say that the loans do not meet their needs 
and that the program is burdensome.  
We propose changes to the program in three areas to increase its usage and effectiveness. 
(Detailed recommendations are in Section 7.) First, to encourage greater use of the program 
by banks, the fees they get from the program could be increased. Such an increase would 
provide greater incentives for banks to make riskier loans than they would be willing to 
make in the absence of the program. Second, we propose that loan terms be more flexible 
and tailored to borrowers’ needs and credit quality. For example, loan rates could be reduced 
for lower-risk loans, greater flexibility could be provided for loan maturities, smaller loans 
could be allowed to help increase participation by small banks and businesses, and loans to 
more highly leveraged firms could be allowed if banks retain a larger share of the loans. 
Finally, restrictions on borrowers under the program, particularly the requirement that they 
make efforts to maintain employment, could be eased. The restrictions on employment could 
limit the ability of firms to restructure their operations in light of changes in business 
practices and industry structure triggered by the coronavirus crisis. The Fed has already 
 
4 For example, some Senators raised concerns at a hearing on implementation of the CARES Act on June 2, 2020, 
that the Main Street program will not be used (see Ransom 2020). For similar concerns, see Mohsin and 
Scigliuzzo (2020) and Elliott, DePillis, and Kiel (2020).   
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made some changes to the original program along these lines, but we believe the current 
program still could be made more attractive for both banks and potential borrowers. 
Adoption of our recommendations would pose additional risk to the funds that Treasury has 
provided to back this program, but we see those risks as likely justified in the current 
circumstances. Even with the recommended changes, the program may have limited 
demand, since many businesses need equity, not more credit, but equity cannot be provided 
in a lending program that would be offered by the Federal Reserve. In addition, banks may 
not want to make more loans without even greater protection, given the uncertain economic 
outlook. While the program could become more attractive to banks if the economy remains 
very weak and loan losses mount further, putting pressure on banks’ balance sheet capacity, 
banks likely will still not be anxious to take on more risk in that scenario.  
However, it is critical to provide support now for viable businesses that have large credit 
needs as a result of the crisis. The downturn is very deep, the risk of permanent harm to 
labor markets because of protracted high unemployment is high, and business activity is 
likely to resume more slowly than was thought when the CARES Act was signed. While the 
structure of the Main Street Program has significant benefits, particularly the use of the Fed 
to leverage Treasury capital, policymakers should be prepared for the possibility that an 
aggressive lending program consistent with the CARES Act may not be sufficient to help 
many businesses. In that case, Congress should be prepared to authorize other types of 
support beyond the Fed’s emergency lending, such as loan guarantees or forgiveness. In 
addition, the Federal Reserve could implement a funding for lending program to encourage 
lending by providing low-cost funding to banks.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes characteristics of 
potential MSLP borrowers and why private lending is likely to be insufficient; Section 3 
describes constraints for the Fed and Treasury, and information- and incentive-related 
challenges when designing a government lending program; and Section 4 presents three 
alternative types of government programs to increase lending, some of which have been 
used in other countries. Section 5 outlines the MSLP program and how it addresses the main 
design challenges, and Sections 6 and 7 present our assessment and recommendations to 
improve the odds of success.   
2. Why a government program for these businesses? 
The government may want to help provide credit for small and medium-sized firms, as well 
as larger firms that are not investment-grade, for the same reasons that it is providing 
support for small businesses (through the Paycheck Protection Program) and larger, near-
investment-grade and investment-grade businesses (through the Fed’s commercial paper5 
and corporate bond6 programs). That is, many viable firms with large declines in revenue 
 
5 The Fed announced the Commercial Paper Funding Facility on March 17, 2020. More information can be found 
here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff.htm. 
6 The Fed announced the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) and the Secondary Market 
Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) on March 23, 2020. The PMCCF supports credit to employers through bonds 
and loan issuances. The SCMCCF provides liquidity to the market for outstanding corporate bonds. Information 
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during the health emergency could fail if they don’t have sufficient access to credit, which 
would slow the economic recovery as enterprise value is lost and workers need to look for 
and retrain for new jobs. 
Private lending may be insufficient in this case because the social benefits from a more 
robust recovery and fewer inefficient bankruptcies will exceed the private benefits to banks 
from more loans. Banks may be wary of lending more because they don’t want to expand 
their balance sheets or because they do not want to increase risky loans. Moreover, the risk 
on such loans is highly correlated with that of other similar loans already on banks’ books, 
and this correlation is likely to be especially high in current circumstances, as the progress 
of the coronavirus will be an important driver of defaults on a wide range of both business 
and household credit. 
We discuss below the employment and risk of potential Main Street borrowers, and reasons 
why private lending to them might be insufficient.  
A. Employment and risk of potential Main Street borrowers  
Employment of small and medium-sized businesses. Businesses that might access the 
MSLP employ a significant fraction of the labor force. Data from the Census Bureau show that 
in aggregate there were 128.6 million employees in almost 6 million firms in 2017 (Table 1). 
The vast majority of the firms are small with fewer than 100 employees, and combined they 
employ 33 percent of the aggregate workforce. But there are about 111,000 firms that have 
between 100 and 10,000 employees each, and they collectively have 48 million employees, 
38 percent of the aggregate. Annual payroll expenses at these firms represent 40 percent of 
the aggregate. That is, the set of firms that fall between very small businesses, those with less 
than 100 employees, and the very large firms with more than 10,000 employees, represent 
roughly 40 percent of employment and payroll. Note that these data can only approximate 
what firms are eligible for MSLP because data are not provided for firms with between 
10,000 and 15,000 employees, and revenues of these firms are not available by number of 
employees.7  
While firms with between 100 and 500 employees are eligible for the PPP program, they may 
also be interested in an MSLP loan. These firms had an average annual payroll expense of 
$9.9 million, so they could make use of a Main Street loan, given the minimum loan size of 
$250,000. Their average payroll expenses are considerably higher than the average payroll 
of $305,000 for firms with fewer than 100 employees. Indeed, the smaller firms may find 
PPP loans sufficient to their needs; the average PPP loan made was $114,764, though 64 
percent of the total number of loans was for less than $50,000.8  
 
on the PMCCF can be found here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/pmccf.htm, and 
information on the SCF can be accessed here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/smccf.htm. 
7 MSLP eligible applicants are limited to firms with less than 15,000 employees and no more than $5 billion in 
revenue. 
8 While we don’t know the characteristics of firms that received PPP loans, it appears they are mainly among 
the 5.88 million very small firms that would have fewer than 100 employees, with an average of seven 
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Table 1. Firm Employment by Size 
Firm 







Size  Firms   ment Payroll  Payroll Firm  
    ($000)  ($000) 
       
Total 5,996,900 128,591,812 100% 6,725,346,754 100% 1,121 
<5 3,698,086 5,937,081  276,569,783  75 
5 to 99 2,186,317 36,507,469  1,520,676,007  318 
Subtotal < 100 5,884,403 42,444,550 33% 1,797,245,790 27% 305 
100-499  92,358 18,111,531  914,291,189  9,899 
500-999 10,082 7,000,139  369,884,610  36,688 
1,000 to 2,499 5,887 9,042,640  520,748,082  88,457 
2,500 to 9,999 3,070 14,253,746  889,750,821  289,821 
Subtotal 100-
9,999 111,397 48,408,056 38% 2,694,674,702 40% 24,190 
10,000+ 1,100 37,739,206 29% 2,233,426,262 33% 2,030,388 
 
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB), Census Bureau, 2017. SUSB total excludes the self-
employed, employees of private households, employees in the railroad and agricultural 
production sectors, and most government employees. 
Risk of potential Main Street borrowers. Data on the riskiness of the debt of small-to-mid-
sized firms that might access the Main Street Program are fragmentary. But it is clear that 
these firms are much less risky than the smallest firms, those eligible for SBA-guaranteed 
loans, but riskier than firms that are rated investment-grade. Some of the larger firms that 
are not investment-grade that might want to access the MSLP may be speculative-grade 
risks, which tend to have higher default rates than the small-to-mid-sized firms because they 
have a need and the ability to raise large amounts of debt.  
Data on debt-to-asset ratios and failure rates reflect this risk profile. The Federal Reserve’s 
Financial Stability Report (May 2020) shows the debt-to-asset ratios of commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loan borrowers (from the banks that are required to undergo the Dodd-
Frank stress tests, and hence file form FR Y-14Q). Reporting borrowers that are not publicly 
traded can be used to approximate the borrowers that might be interested in Main Street 
loans (Figure 1). As shown, these firms have somewhat higher debt-to-asset ratios than 
publicly traded firms that have C&I loans. The debt ratios of these firms have been rising in 
the past few years, though less rapidly than at publicly traded firms.  
 
employees and an average payroll of $305,000. The number of PPP loans reached 5.2 million by August 8, 2020, 
for total funds of $525 billion. In terms of the distribution of loan sizes, 64 percent of the total number of loans 
were less than $50,000, another 30 percent were between $50,000 and $350,000, and only 6 percent were 
above $350,000.  (See Small Business Administration, 2020.)  
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Comparing these ratios to those for all nonfinancial publicly traded companies, a debt-to-
asset ratio of 34 percent in 2019 for non-public C&I loan borrowers is much lower than for 
speculative-grade firms, labeled as risky firms, which have had ratios of above 40 percent in 
recent years. These data suggest that many potential Main Street borrowers are less risky 
than speculative-grade firms but more risky than investment-grade companies.  




Source: Federal Reserve Board Financial Stability Report, May 2020 and May 2019. 
Loan delinquency rates also suggest that smaller business loans will have higher default 
rates than investment-grade bond issuers but may have lower default rates than speculative-
grade bond issuers. PayNet reports, based on data for C&I loans provided by a sample of 
commercial banks, that default rates for small businesses averaged about 3 percent over 
2006-2019, higher than the 1.7 percent default rate on all C&I loans at commercial banks, 
which includes loans to large publicly-traded firms.   
For comparison, the average default rate on investment-grade corporate bonds was 0.12 
percent from 1981-2017 but was 4.3 percent for speculative-grade corporate bonds over the 
same period (Standard and Poor’s). This average default rate for speculative-grade firms is 
higher than that for loans to small-to-mid-sized borrowers that would access the MSLP.  
In addition, data from the Census suggest there is a wide range in risk characteristics in the 
category of small-to-mid-sized firms (Table 2). The overall business failure rate peaked at 
9.67 percent in 2009, dominated by the nearly 4.96 million small firms, those with less than 
100 employees, which had a failure rate of 9.86 percent in 2009. But the failure rates drop 
off dramatically as firms get larger. The average failure rate for businesses with between 100 
and 500 employees was 0.99 percent in 2009, and it was only 0.35 percent for businesses 
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with between 500 and 9,999 employees. These sharp distinctions by size group in 2009 are 
also evident for average failure rates during the twenty-year period 1994-2014.  
Table 2. Business Failure Rates9  
Firm Employment  Number of Firms Failure rate Failure rate 
Size 2014 2009 (%) 1994-2014 (%) 
     
Total 5,060,326 9.67 8.33 
< 100 4,955,252 9.86 8.48 
100 to 499 84,541 0.99 0.98 
500 to 9,999 19,163 0.35 0.30 
Subtotal 100-9,999 103,704 0.88 0.86 
 
Source: Census Bureau, Longitudinal Business Database 1977-2014. 
Overall, the loan default and failure data suggest that lending to small-to-mid-sized 
businesses with more modest needs for debt is less risky than lending to firms that issue 
speculative-grade bonds, though both are riskier than lending to investment-grade 
companies. Moreover, the losses on defaulted loans, which are generally more senior, tend 
to be lower than those on defaulted speculative-grade bonds.  
B. Why might private lending not be sufficient?  
Given that these businesses are significant employers, policymakers would like to ensure 
that those that are harmed temporarily but can succeed after COVID-19 risks diminish have 
access to the credit they need to survive this difficult period. Unfortunately, however, a 
substantial fraction of banks have recently tightened their lending standards on loans to 
businesses, according to the July 2020 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, suggesting that 
private lenders may not be willing and able to provide the needed credit (Figure 2).  
 
9 The number of failures for firms in this sample with more than 10,000 employees was missing for many years, 
so we do not report the failure rate for that category. 
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Figure 2. Lending standards for C&I loans at commercial banks  
 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). 
There are four reasons why policymakers may believe that lending by banks to these firms 
is likely to prove insufficient.10 The main reason is that the social benefits from a more robust 
economy and fewer inefficient bankruptcies will exceed the private benefits to banks and 
borrowers from more loans. That is, there are net positive externalities which arise by 
promoting a more rapid recovery in output and employment, given that levels currently are 
so depressed, and so encouraging a positive cycle of more spending and more employment. 
In addition, banks on their own do not capture the aggregate benefits to society if all banks 
lend more and a worse aggregate economic outcome is avoided.  
Furthermore, additional lending may avoid a negative externality from having a large 
number of firms go bankrupt in a short interval. If that were to happen, the bankruptcy 
system could be overwhelmed, and the result could be that some firms that could have been 
reorganized in bankruptcy end up in liquidation, with a consequent social loss.11 Moreover, 
 
10 Eligible lenders in the Main Street Lending Program are banking organizations, not all types of lenders. If 
bank balance sheet concerns are limiting banks’ willingness to lend, then allowing nonbanks to have access to 
the program could increase usage. But nonbank lenders would have to be vetted to be sure that they had the 
ability to do the underwriting.  However, given the many potential complications involved in the program, the 
Fed may see it as helpful to operate through entities overseen by the federal banking regulators.   
11 Miller and Stiglitz (2010) have argued that in financial crises there may need to be a temporary “Super 
Chapter 11” to quickly deal with a large number of bankruptcies in a way that limits harm to the economy.   
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the social costs of bankruptcy for smaller owner-manager firms may be relatively greater 
than the social costs for larger firms with outside equity holders (Brunnermeier and 
Krishnamurthy, 2020). More of a smaller firm’s enterprise value may be attributed to owner 
know-how, and because personal assets may have been pledged to secure a bank loan, a 
small firm’s failure likely would result in personal bankruptcy as well, making it difficult for 
the owner to restart the firm.  
A second reason there may be insufficient lending is that banks’ funding costs may be too 
high because of dysfunction in term-funding markets. Higher funding costs limit the 
profitability of lending, and a government program that provides lower cost funding could 
be helpful. The spread of the three-month LIBOR to OIS was elevated following the start of 
the pandemic, suggesting funding pressures for some banking institutions, although that 
spread subsequently fell back.  
A third reason to be concerned about access to credit is that banks may lack the risk appetite 
to make additional loans. Banks no doubt are already expecting a big increase in loan losses 
because of the economic slowdown due to the virus, and the risks of new loans to borrowers 
harmed by the virus will be highly correlated with the existing risks. Banks may also be 
concerned about downside risks to loan quality given the elevated uncertainty about the 
economic growth trajectory, especially in the case of smaller and riskier firms. That 
uncertainty may make them even less willing to lend. 
Finally, banks may face balance sheet constraints that limit their willingness to lend. The 
constraints could reflect capital regulation or pressures from creditors and counterparties. 
Banks have been operating with capital above regulatory and supervisory requirements, 
with the largest banks operating with a Tier 1 common equity (CET1) ratio of 12 percent on 
average in 2019, but loans rose sharply in March and April as businesses drew down existing 
credit lines (Figure 3).12 Banks announced substantial loan loss provisions in the first 
quarter, though the full effects of loan losses on capital in coming quarters are still unknown. 
If a bank’s CET1 ratio were to fall by enough that it fell into its regulatory buffers, such as the 
capital conservation buffer and GSIB capital buffer, it would be required to cut dividends, 
share repurchases, and compensation.  
  
 
12 The Federal Reserve estimates that business borrowers drew down significant amounts of their committed 
credit lines in March and April.  C&I loans increased by about $660 billion in those two months, and the Fed 
estimates that only a little more than half were by firms with investment-grade ratings. (Federal Reserve 
Financial Stability Report, May 2020, Box “Risks Associated with Banks’ Corporate Credit Exposures through 
Credit Lines.”) 
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Figure 3. Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks 
 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US). 
 
Moreover, new lending could push some of the largest banks into the next size category used 
to calculate the SIFI capital surcharge since size is one of the five components determining 
the size of the surcharge. Moving into the next category would raise its capital requirement 
by 50 basis points. This nonlinear effect may restrain banks’ willingness to lend to marginal 
customers. As a consequence, banks may be unwilling to meet the demand for credit even 
from less risky firms.13  
  
 
13 Note that balance sheet constraints could be eased, at least partly, with regulatory changes. Indeed, federal 
regulators have provided some temporary changes in regulation to address such constraints. Leverage ratios 
for BHCs and bank subsidiaries were relaxed by permitting the deduction of Treasury securities and deposits 
at the Fed from exposure measures. In addition, under the new stress test capital buffer, they are not included 
as a minimum regulatory requirement. Also, loans under the MMLF and PPPLF are excluded from leverage ratio 
calculations. However, while regulators can take steps to ease these constraints, they cannot make banks lend.   
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3. Challenges when designing a business lending program 
The design of a program to support bank lending to businesses in the current health crisis 
can be thought of as the solution to a constrained maximization problem. The objective is to 
increase loans to borrowers that can survive the health crisis and succeed after the crisis 
passes, but that would not otherwise be able to get a loan in the current environment. The 
constraints on the program include the legal restrictions on the Federal Reserve’s emergency 
lending under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, as well as the ability and willingness 
of the Federal Reserve and Treasury to absorb losses in the conduct of the program. If 
policymakers are willing to take on more risk of loss, then they are more likely to succeed in 
boosting lending to the desired borrowers. The problem is complicated, however, by several 
information- and incentive-related problems that policy makers face, including asymmetric 
information, adverse selection, inefficient targeting of the support, and moral hazard. 
A. Constraints on the Federal Reserve and Treasury 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act puts a number of conditions on the ability of the 
Federal Reserve to operate an emergency lending program. These conditions include 
(Federal Reserve 2020a):14 
• The circumstances must be “unusual and exigent;”  
• The program must be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury; 
• Eligibility for the program must be “broad-based,” which the Federal Reserve has 
judged to mean that the program is open to at least five firms (Federal Reserve, 2015); 
• Program borrowers must be “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from 
other banking institutions;” 
• Borrowers under the program must be solvent, and program lending cannot assist a 
“single and specific company” in avoiding bankruptcy; 
• Loans under the program must be “[e]indorsed or otherwise secured to the 
satisfaction of the [lending] Reserve Bank” and the Fed must take steps to ensure that the 
“security for emergency loans is sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses.” 
In addition, the CARES Act requires that loans made under 13(3) programs in the current 
crisis cannot be forgiven. This requirement sets the 13(3) lending apart from the Paycheck 
 
14 One way to avoid the constraints that Section 13(3) imposes on the program would be to have the Treasury 
operate the program directly.  Indeed, given the need for direct credit allocation and possible concerns about 
central bank independence, it may be desirable to not have the central bank involved in such programs.  And, 
as discussed below, in the U.K. and Germany, programs to support business lending are run by national 
development banks.  However, Congress would in any case decide on the statutory constraints on the program, 
and it may see the structure imposed by the Federal Reserve Act as helpful in limiting risk.  Congress may also 
have felt that the Federal Reserve has expertise that would  help make the program successful, and it may value 
the ability of the Federal Reserve to leverage the capital provided by the Treasury to increase the size of the 
lending program without increasing Treasury debt issuance.   
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Protection Program because PPP loans are intended to be essentially grants. With no loan 
forgiveness allowed, the 13(3) loans will be much less expensive for the government, but 
also much less attractive to the borrowers.  
The first three of the 13(3) conditions are clearly satisfied in the current circumstances. The 
fourth is satisfied by a Fed requirement that borrowers certify their difficulty in obtaining 
credit from sources other than the Federal Reserve, and the fifth condition should be 
satisfied by any program aimed at firms that can survive the crisis if they obtain credit, which 
is the aim of the program. The final condition poses greater difficulty, since business loans 
involve significant risk, as noted earlier, and that risk is presumably increased in the current 
circumstances. However, in the CARES Act, Congress provided the Treasury with $454 billion 
that it can use to provide security for loans made under the Federal Reserve’s 13(3) lending 
programs. The decision as to how much capital to allocate to each lending program is up to 
the Treasury Secretary, who has the authority to allocate the funds authorized in the CARES 
Act.  
The Treasury has considerable influence over an emergency lending program because the 
Fed must obtain the permission of the Treasury Secretary to establish any emergency 
lending program under section 13(3) and because the decision by the Treasury Secretary to 
allocate capital to a lending program constrains the size of the program given the 13(3) 
conditions, and allows the Treasury Secretary to condition the provision of capital on 
program terms that he judges acceptable, given his willingness to put the funds allocated at 
risk. Thus far, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin has indicated that he has only a limited tolerance 
for possible losses. In April, the Secretary noted that some of the Fed’s programs would make 
money while others would lose money, but he indicated that, across the programs, “in a base 
case scenario…we recover our money.” He added that “If Congress wanted me to lose all the 
money, that money would have been designed as subsidies and grants as opposed to credit 
support” (Davidson and Rubin 2020). At a subsequent Congressional hearing, however, the 
Secretary seemed somewhat more willing to risk taking losses, stating that “our intention is 
that we expect to take some losses on these facilities…That is our base case scenario” 
(Timiraos and Davidson 2020). Based on these comments, the Secretary appears to be 
willing to commit capital to a program with a modest probability of taking losses, but he 
appears averse to committing taxpayer funds to back a program that is highly likely to have 
significant losses. Given the riskiness of business lending, particularly to small and medium-
sized firms, this aversion to losses places significant constraints on the design of a program 
to support such lending. 
In part, expectations for losses on 13(3) lending programs in this crisis may reflect the 
outcome following the financial crisis of 2007-09. In that period, the Federal Reserve 
extended $600 billion of loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. All of the loans 
were repaid in full, with interest. As a result, the Fed actually made $7 billion on its broad-
based 13(3) lending programs (Fleming and Klagge, 2011).15 For the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP), the government earned $29.5 billion from its commitments of $269.6 
 
15 Including non-13(3) lending via the discount window, the Term Auction Facility, the Single-tranche Repo 
Program, and the Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines, the Fed made a total of nearly $13 billion (Fleming and 
Klagge 2011, Table 2).   
13
Designing the Main Street Lending Program English and Liang
 
billion to financial firms and the credit market programs (Liang, McConnell, and Swagel, 
2020).  
However, the current situation is very different. In 2007-09, the main problem was a loss of 
confidence in the financial sector and a consequent run on virtually all forms of short-term 
wholesale funding. In such a situation, the Federal Reserve could, by committing sufficient 
funds, slow and ultimately reverse the runs, and as confidence returned, the loans made by 
the Fed would be repaid. By contrast, the current situation is characterized by a health crisis 
that is forcing workers to stay home and businesses to close. The result is a massive loss of 
revenue for many businesses that is likely to leave many of them insolvent once the health 
crisis passes. Because the Federal Reserve can only provide credit, and not transfers, there 
are many businesses that the Fed’s programs cannot help. As a consequence, aggressive 
lending is likely to lead to significant losses in this case.    
B. Information- and incentive-related challenges 
In addition to the legal and financial constraints on the Fed’s 13(3) lending, a business 
lending program must be designed to address four information- and incentive-related 
challenges. First, there is the problem of asymmetric information. Borrowers have private 
information about their prospects—for example, their likely viability once the coronavirus 
has ebbed—that the Federal Reserve and Treasury do not have. For larger public companies, 
considerable information can be obtained at relatively low cost, but for smaller and medium-
sized firms, there is little information that is publicly available. Banks, through their 
customer relationships and long experience underwriting business loans, can make well-
informed judgements about the outlook for potential borrowers. By contrast, the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury have little experience in this area, and so a business lending 
program that requires the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to do the loan underwriting is 
likely to have a high level of losses. As a consequence, it may be beneficial to design the 
program to incentivize banks to participate and provide the loan underwriting needed to 
limit risk.  
However, using banks to do the underwriting of program loans could lead to a second 
problem involving the behavior of banks—adverse selection. Specifically, banks may have 
an incentive to keep lower-risk loans on their own books and only pass to the program those 
loans that are high risk. Within limits, such behavior is desirable since it should help provide 
additional credit to the intended firms. However, if the program design is not calibrated 
appropriately, banks may not have an incentive to limit the risk of the loans that are made 
under the program, imposing very high losses on the Fed and the Treasury without a 
compensating macroeconomic benefit. Moreover, if the spread on program loans is very 
wide, then only very risky borrowers will be willing to participate, which could also result in 
excessive losses.  
Some program designs, perhaps responding to the possibility of adverse selection, could 
suffer from a third problem—poor targeting. In this case, the borrowers receiving loans 
under the program may be those that do not need the support to survive the health crisis 
and continue to operate. Instead, banks may make loans that they would have been willing 
to make without the program, but then pass them to the program to benefit from fees or 
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other incentives. While such loans would likely be low risk, and so would not impose 
significant costs on the Treasury, they could crowd out loans to the firms for which the 
program is intended, reducing its effectiveness.  
Finally, even an effective business lending program undertaken during the coronavirus crisis 
could lead to subsequent moral hazard. The Federal Reserve has been very public for many 
years in its concern that outsized borrowing by lower-rated nonfinancial firms and 
associated excesses in the syndicated loan market were resulting in fragilities that would act 
as an accelerant in a downturn. If the Federal Reserve now provides significant ex-post 
support to firms and lenders that it has been criticizing, managers and investors could take 
the lesson that the Fed’s warnings about financial stability risks can be dismissed and that 
ex-post support for imprudent risk taking will be forthcoming in future downturns (Federal 
Reserve Financial Stability Report, May 2019). The result would be greater risks to financial 
stability once the current crisis has passed. In addition, the Federal Reserve and Treasury 
may be concerned about reputational risk. Lending to already-highly leveraged firms could 
be subject to considerable public criticism, especially if there are large losses on loans to 
firms that had leveraged up to make payments to private-equity owners.  
Of course, even highly leveraged firms have employees and suppliers, and so addressing the 
moral hazard problem by limiting lending to such firms would have macroeconomic costs. 
However, policymakers may judge that the larger, more leveraged firms are likely to have 
management with the skills and experience necessary to use the bankruptcy system to 
impose losses on creditors and continue in operation, making credit support less critical for 
such firms.  
The Federal Reserve and Treasury may want to consider—or may be required to consider 
under the CARES Act—some other factors. For example, there might be social objectives, 
such as sustaining employment, that need to be incorporated into the program. In addition, 
to limit the need for government resources, borrowing firms could be required to limit 
dividends and share repurchases, and there could be constraints on executive compensation 
as well.16 Such restrictions might make borrowers less willing to participate in the program, 
and employment requirements could slow a necessary reallocation of labor across sectors 
as a result of the health crisis. However, such restrictions might help with the targeting of 
program resources, since firms that were facing bankruptcy would presumably be willing to 
abide by the restrictions, while firms that could survive without a program loan would be 
less inclined to do so. Moreover, such restrictions may mitigate moral hazard concerns of 
helping borrowers that had taken on too much leverage before the pandemic.  
4. The three main policy options  
We describe three main options for a government program to support business credit, 
including how they can address the information and incentive problems noted above. We 
 
16 Whether the program is legally required to take account of these considerations under the CARES Act is not 
clear to us, and we have heard opinions on both sides.   
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also summarize, for comparison to the U.S., the programs put in place in the U.K. and 
Germany to respond to the coronavirus.  
A. Three main policy options 
There are three main options: subsidies, such as provision of low-cost funding; guarantees 
to limit downside risk; and participation in loans by the central bank or government. The 
options differ in how they address the information and incentive challenges, so they may be 
more or less helpful in a given circumstance. (See a summary of factors in Table 3.)  
 
Table 3. Programs to Increase Lending  
  
 Option 
 Subsidy Guarantee Participation 
Helpful if bank lending 
is constrained by: 
   
• High funding 
costs 
Yes No No 
• Limited risk 
appetite 
Some Yes No 
• Balance sheet 
constraints 
Some No Yes 
Can address challenges 
caused by: 
   
• Asymmetric 
information 
Yes Partially Partially 
• Adverse 
selection 
Yes Partially Partially 









Option 1: Subsidies 
The central bank or other government entity can encourage business lending by providing 
lenders with a subsidy for such loans. A simple way to do this is to provide low-cost funding 
in return for new lending to businesses. An example of such a program is the “Funding for 
Lending Scheme” that the Bank of England established in 2012. Under the program, banks, 
in effect, received low-cost funding from the Bank of England, with the amount of funding 
and its pricing depending on the amount of new lending to U.K. businesses and households 
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by the bank.17 The Fed could provide a similar incentive for business lending in the current 
crisis by offering longer-term, low-cost financing to banks, with the amount of funding 
available to each bank, and perhaps its pricing as well, depending on the amount of a bank’s 
lending to targeted firms—for example, U.S. businesses with fewer than 15,000 employees.  
Such a program would help to internalize the positive externalities of such loans. For an 
unchanged loan interest rate, the lower funding costs would give banks a larger spread on 
loans, and that would provide extra compensation for risk-taking or increasing balance sheet 
size. A program along these lines is likely to be more useful if bank term funding spreads are 
high, either because term funding markets are stressed, or banks are viewed as weak. In such 
a case, the provision of low-cost central bank funding in return for new business loans could 
greatly reduce the marginal cost of such lending, and so have a significant effect on loan rates 
and banks’ willingness and ability to provide loans.18 On the other hand, if the banking 
system is generally seen as healthy, and banks can obtain wholesale term funding at low cost, 
then the program presumably would be less effective. Nonetheless, the central bank could 
still encourage lending by providing longer-term funding at a low rate—perhaps at the policy 
rate, as the Bank of England is doing (see below). A reliable source of stable, low cost funding 
should increase banks’ willingness to provide longer-term loans to businesses.   
Under such a program, banks would continue to do the underwriting for their loans, and the 
loans would remain on their books, with the banks responsible for any losses. As a 
consequence, the central bank would not have to worry about asymmetric information or 
adverse selection. In addition, unless the subsidy were very large, it seems unlikely to lead 
banks to provide loans to firms with very high leverage and risk, mitigating potential moral-
hazard problems. The central bank could also decide on the size of the program and so could 
control the cost of the subsidy.  
However, a funding for lending program may not target the assistance very well. For 
example, if the low-cost funding is available for all small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
loans, banks may choose to lend more at lower rates to relatively safe firms that would have 
gotten loans in any case. The firms that were not getting credit, and which need loans to 
survive the crisis, might still be seen as highly risky—particularly given the banks’ existing 
exposures to coronavirus risk—or as generating an undesirable increase in balance-sheet 
size. One way to improve targeting would be to base the amount of low-cost funding on a 
more narrowly targeted set of firms, for which credit is critical for firm survival. However, 
efforts to target the program in such a way would run into the asymmetric information 
problem—the central bank does not have the information needed to identify such firms. As 
discussed below, the Bank of England and the ECB have provided low cost funding to banks 
to increase lending to SMEs, but have not tried to target their programs more narrowly, 
presumably on the view that an overall increase in SME lending should lead to some increase 
in lending to firms that would not have received loans otherwise.  
 
17 The banks actually received secured loans of government securities, which they could then use to obtain 
funding in the repo market. See Churm and Radia (2012) for details. Churm, et al. (2015) provide evidence on 
the macroeconomic effects of the program. 
18 For evidence on these effects, see Havrylchyk (2016).   
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Option 2: Guarantees 
Business lending could be encouraged by providing, in return for a below-market fee, a 
guarantee that limits the downside risk to the lender. For example, the Treasury could 
guarantee repayment of at least 80 percent of the loan amount, leaving the lender 
responsible for only the first 20 percent of losses.19 Such a guarantee would encourage banks 
to make loans that are riskier than those they would otherwise make. In the current crisis, 
banks may be particularly concerned about tail risks, in which the virus has larger and more 
protracted economic effects. By limiting the maximum loss on additional loans, the 
guarantee would make banks more willing lenders. However, if bank lending were limited 
by balance-sheet constraints, guarantees would be less helpful, since the loans would remain 
on banks’ books.20  
Guarantees could be structured to address the information problems raised by lending 
programs, though the problems would remain. So long as the first-loss position retained by 
the banks was sufficiently large, banks would still need to do loan underwriting. As a result, 
a guarantee program would help address the asymmetric information problem, since banks 
would have an incentive to use the information they have on the riskiness of borrowers when 
approving loans. Similarly, banks with a first-loss position would have an incentive to avoid 
loans that had a high probability of default, limiting the adverse selection problem. However, 
there could still be some adverse selection, since banks might make loans that had a high risk 
of very adverse outcomes, since their downside risk would be capped by the guarantee.  
Given the limited information available to the central bank, targeting a guarantee program 
correctly would be a challenge. If the guarantee fee were set too low, then banks would have 
an incentive to make too many risky loans to firms that are unlikely to survive the crisis. The 
result would be very high expenses for the government, without a commensurate 
macroeconomic benefit. In addition, providing low-cost guarantees for loans to risky, 
leveraged firms could encourage moral hazard after the recovery gets underway. However, 
excessively high fees would also be a potential problem, since they would discourage use of 
the program, and so not help provide credit to the firms that need it.  
Option 3: Participations 
The final option is for the central bank to take some or all of the business loans onto its own 
books through purchases of loan participations. Under this arrangement, banks would make 
the loans and sell a portion (perhaps even all) of each loan to the central bank, and in return 
banks would receive fees for originating and servicing the loans. This approach would allow 
the program to provide credit to businesses while harnessing the banks’ information and 
underwriting advantages. It would also remove the portion of the loan purchased by the 
program from the bank’s balance sheet, directly addressing limits on lending due to balance 
 
19 The Federal Reserve would find it difficult to provide such a guarantee given the legal constraints on Section 
13(3) lending.  
20 In the case of a partial guarantee, the remaining portion of the loan would still be included in the calculation 
of the risk-weighted capital ratios. And even with a 100 percent guarantee, the loan would count toward the 
leverage ratio, unless the banking agencies provided a temporary exception.   
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sheet constraints. However, by leaving a pari passu share of the loan on the banks’ books, 
participations may not address limits on lending that reflect banks’ concerns about risk since 
the portion of the loan that the bank retains would have the same risk characteristics as the 
entire loan and would have to meet the bank’s underwriting criteria. Of course, the program 
fees—either up-front origination fees or servicing fees paid over the life of the loan—would 
encourage risk-taking and increase lending. Up-front fees would, in effect, provide additional 
capital to support the lending, while fees paid over the life of the loan would boost the 
effective risk spread on the loan.  
A participation structure would help address some of the information problems noted 
earlier. So long as the lending banks retain a significant enough portion of the loans, they will 
have an incentive to do careful underwriting, reducing the asymmetric information problem. 
Indeed, because they are taking a vertical slice of the loan, their underwriting incentives are 
not affected by the program except as a result of the fees provided. And, so long as the sale 
of the participation to the program is made at the time of the loan, this structure should also 
help limit the adverse selection problem, since banks will retain the risk on the part of the 
loans they keep. Vardoulakis (2020) argues that when banks provide important monitoring 
services, offering them an option to retain a higher share of the loan can reduce adverse 
selection to the central bank, though the welfare gains are modest relative to a constant risk 
retention share. In contrast, if banks sell the entire loan to the program, as suggested recently 
by Hubbard and Scott (2020), then the bank would have no incentive to underwrite the loans 
to limit risk.  
Even if banks retained a portion of the loans, policymakers might be concerned that the 
program would not provide a sufficient incentive for banks to perform appropriate 
underwriting and limit adverse selection. If so, the program could impose a minimum set of 
underwriting standards for eligible loans. However, such standards would require 
borrowers to satisfy two sets of underwriting criteria, one set by the program and the other 
by lending banks. The two sets of underwriting criteria could excessively limit the set of 
eligible business loans, suggesting that the standards set by the program be kept relatively 
simple, so as not to overly constrain the program.  
Stein (2020) suggests an additional structural element to help address the asymmetric 
information and adverse selection problems: extending program loans in several tranches 
over time. The program would start by making relatively small loans, and then provide 
additional credit contingent on how the borrower’s situation evolves, as well as incoming 
information on the coronavirus. So, firms that had particularly large losses might not get 
additional credit, since they would be unlikely to emerge from the crisis as a viable firm 
unless they received transfers from the government. This tranched approach would allow 
the government to set easier ex ante underwriting standards while still limiting the 
government’s exposure to loss. Stein also proposes the use of less-senior claims, such as 
preferred stock, to reduce potential debt-overhang post crisis, with the program taking 
warrants to gain some upside to compensate for the increased risk. That approach could 
have benefits, but the Federal Reserve can only lend, not purchase stock. Moreover, the 
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resulting equity stakes would be difficult for the government to exit in the case of small-to-
mid-sized businesses, which generally do not have preferred stock.21  
B. Approaches employed in other countries  
Many countries are facing similar issues related to the effects of the coronavirus on firms’ 
revenues and the consequent need to ensure the availability of credit. While a complete 
catalog of the approaches that have been taken would be well beyond the scope of this paper, 
it is interesting to consider some of the approaches taken in other jurisdictions. For example, 
the approaches in the U.K. and Germany are broadly similar but differ substantially from 
those taken in the United States. In both of the European countries, the focus has been on 
providing loan guarantees and low-cost funding, with relatively little use of participations.  
In the U.K., the British Business Bank, a government development bank, is providing 
guarantees of new loans to small and medium-sized businesses. (See table A1.) There is a 
100 percent guarantee of smaller loans (based on 2019 turnover, but limited to £50,000), 
and an 80 percent guarantee of larger loans. Borrowers must be British firms, and there are 
limits on loan maturity as well as on the payment of interest and fees in the first year. The 
British Business Bank also has a program offering convertible loans that is aimed at newer, 
faster-growing firms. That program will match private funds raised now, and the loan 
converts to equity when the firm next raises equity finance.  
In Germany, the bulk of the support is in the form of loan guarantees provided by the 
government development bank, KfW, under several separate guarantee programs. (See table 
A2.) In addition, both the federal government and state governments have other assistance 
programs. The KfW provides guarantees to lending banks for 100 percent of the loan amount 
for smaller loans (limited based on 2019 turnover, but as much as €800,000) and generally 
for 90 or 80 percent for larger loans. Borrowers must satisfy some broad criteria—e.g., 
operating in Germany and not having been already troubled prior to the coronavirus crisis. 
Some loan terms are set by the programs (e.g., maximum maturity and interest rates), and 
there are significant restrictions on the borrowing firms, including limits on executive 
compensation, limits on the ability of firm to pay dividends, and limits on capital 
distributions. In addition to the guarantee programs, the KfW also has a program under 
which it will purchase participations in large, syndicated loans. 
While these programs have not been undertaken by the central bank, in both jurisdictions 
the central bank has also taken steps to support lending to businesses. In the U.K., the Bank 
of England and the Treasury have opened a COVID Corporate Financing Facility under which 
the Bank will purchase eligible commercial paper in the primary and secondary market, 
including from middle-market firms that have not previously issued commercial paper, on 
terms comparable to those prior to the crisis, and with maturities of up to a year (Bank of 
England 2020a). In addition, the Bank of England is providing low-cost funding to banks 
through its “Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs.” The program offers 
 
21 A possible way to benefit from something like a warrant in the case of small firms would be to require the 
firm to agree to a higher income tax rate starting a few years after the health crisis ends. The firms that survive 
and are operating at that time would, in effect, be paying a share of their income to the Treasury.  (See Hanson, 
Stein, Sunderam and Zwick [2020] for a discussion of such a plan.)   
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banks low-cost, four-year funding based on the amount of new lending provided to U.K. 
businesses, with the amount of lending to SMEs given extra weight in the calculation of the 
amount of and rate on the central bank funding (Bank of England 2020b). Given the very low 
level of market rates, the Bank of England concluded that some banks might find it difficult 
to reduce deposit rates in line with market rates, so term funding at low rates would help 
banks to offer lower-cost term loans to their customers.  
In Germany, banks are eligible for the European Central Bank’s Targeted Long-term 
Refinancing Operations (the TLTRO III program). Under this program, banks can receive 
low-cost funding (with rates as much as 50 basis points below the ECB’s deposit rate, so              
-100 basis points) depending on their lending behavior. In addition, the ECB has eased its 
collateral rules to help ensure that banks have the collateral that they need to take advantage 
of the TLTROs. The collateral-easing measures include allowing banks to use SME loans as 
collateral, among other assets, thereby providing low-cost funding that banks can use to 
finance additional SME lending (Lane 2020).22  
5. What was done: The Main Street Lending Program 
In contrast to the British and German subsidy and guarantee programs, the Main Street 
Lending Program is a participation program. Under the program, the Federal Reserve has 
established a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that will purchase 95 percent participations in 
eligible loans. The Treasury has provided $75 billion of capital to support up to $600 billion 
of loans purchased by the SPV. The MSLP consists of three facilities—the New Loan Facility, 
the Priority Loan Facility, and the Expanded Loan Facility—open to borrowers that are U.S. 
businesses with 15,000 or fewer employees, or annual revenue of $5 billion or less. 23  
The three facilities are structured to address the funding needs of different types of firms, 
and they offer different loan sizes and leverage limits. (See Table 4 for a summary). The New 
Loan Facility is aimed primarily at small and medium-sized businesses that do not already 
have high levels of debt. The minimum loan size in this facility was lowered recently to 
$250,000 from $500,000 in April, and from $1 million in March, and the maximum leverage 
is four times 2019 earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). 
The Expanded Loan Facility is aimed at larger firms that may already have significant debt 
outstanding in the form of syndicated loans. The program can allow very substantial loans 
(raised recently to $300 million) to be made to “upsize” an existing loan agreement. Given 
the relatively high debt levels of such firms, the maximum level of leverage in the facility is 
six times EBITDA. The Priority Loan Facility is aimed at small and medium-sized firms that 
may have larger debt than those using the New Loan Facility, and the loans can be used to 
refinance existing credit to another lender as well as to increase borrowing. The maximum 
loan size is $50 million, higher than $35 million in the New Loan Facility, and the maximum 
leverage is higher (again, six times EBITDA).  
 
22 In addition, the ECB has introduced Pandemic Emergency Longer-term Refinancing Operations to provide a 
bridge to the periodic TLTROs (Lane 2020). 
23 On July 17, the Federal Reserve announced Main Street programs for not-for-profit entities. Those programs 
are not considered here.  
21
Designing the Main Street Lending Program English and Liang
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the terms on the loans under the three facilities are quite similar, 
despite the very different types of borrowers and loans that are covered. Notably, in all three 
cases, the borrower pays a rate of LIBOR (one month or three months) plus 300 basis points, 
and the maturity of the loan is five years, despite the large differences in loan size and 
maximum debt coverage ratio requirements. Interest payments are deferred for the first 
year, principal amortization is deferred for the first two years, and repayments of principal 
starting in year three are in similar proportions across the facilities. The origination fee for 
the New and Priority Loan programs is 100 basis points, but it is only 75 basis points for the 
Expanded Loan Facility, presumably reflecting the larger size of the loans under that 
program.  
The facilities are designed to address the four challenges noted earlier. Because the banks 
keep a five percent share of each loan on their books, they have an incentive to do careful 
underwriting, limiting the asymmetric information problem faced by the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury. The retained share also limits adverse selection, since banks cannot avoid 
a portion of any losses on loans under the MSLP. However, the share of credit risk banks 
must retain does not vary by loan risk, suggesting there is no more protection to the Fed and 
Treasury from this source where it is needed more. Under the Expanded Loan Facility, which 
allows the largest and most leveraged loans, there is a limit of 35 percent of the total credit 
of which the loan is a part, which provides an additional significant incentive for the bank to 
take careful account of risk.  
Adverse selection is also addressed by the minimum underwriting criteria that the MSLP 
imposes. Borrowers must have been healthy at the end of 2019, as judged by the lender’s 
internal rating of existing credits at that time, and they must certify that they believe that 
they are able to meet their financial obligations and not file for bankruptcy for at least 90 
days. Borrowers must commit to not using the loan to voluntarily repay other debts before 
the MSLP loan is repaid, and that they will not seek to cancel other credit lines over that 
period. Borrowers also must limit executive compensation, dividends, and capital 
distributions while the loan is outstanding. In addition, lenders under the program must be 
a regulated U.S. depository institution or a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign banking 
institution. In either case, the participating lenders would be subject to supervision by the 
U.S. banking agencies, and so their operations and incentives should be relatively well 
understood. Moreover, the lending banks cannot request early repayment of other debts 
during the life of an MSLP loan, and they cannot cancel or reduce any existing loan 
commitment or line of credit over the same period.  
These program features also help to address some of the constraints on the Fed’s 13(3) 
lending authority. In particular, the incentives for bank underwriting and the minimum 
underwriting criteria help ensure that the borrowers are solvent. In addition, the Fed is 
secured by the SPV collateral and the Treasury capital—presumably to its satisfaction—and 
the Treasury backing should help protect taxpayers from losses. 
Further, the underwriting requirements help to limit the risk of loss to the Treasury. As noted 
earlier, the extent to which the Treasury is willing to take on such risk depends on the 
Treasury Secretary’s risk tolerance, and the Secretary has suggested only a limited 
willingness to take losses on the CARES funds. The actual outcome will depend in part on the 
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calibration of the MSLP. Under the program, the SPV will receive fees from the banks for 
purchasing the 95 percent participations, as well as 95 percent of the spread income on the 
loans (less the servicing fees paid to the bank) over the life of the loan. This income will help 
to offset losses on the loan portfolio. If the fees and spreads are too low relative to the losses 
on the loans, the Treasury could lose money. On the other hand, if fees or spreads are too 
high, the Treasury would earn money on the program. However, the gains and losses are not 
the measure of program success, which must take account of the aid provided to the intended 
firms. 
In that regard, the program terms should also help target the credit to businesses that are 
neither so strong that they do not need the assistance nor so weak that they are likely to fail. 
As we note below, strong firms will not find the pricing attractive, since they are likely able 
to borrow at a spread less than 300 basis points. Such firms also will not want to accept the 
constraints the program imposes on dividends and capital distributions. In addition, the 
MSLP requires that borrowing firms must make “commercially reasonable efforts” to 
maintain employment and payroll during the life of the loan, a constraint that stronger firms 
would likely choose to avoid, given uncertainty about what compliance would entail and the 
potential need to restructure some of their operations in response to the economic fallout 
from the virus. Conversely, very weak firms will likely not satisfy the requirements of the 
program (such as the limits on leverage), helping to limit the program to borrowers most 
likely to benefit from a loan.  
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Table 4. Main Street Lending Program Terms 
 




Supporting new loans 
to businesses that are 
small or medium-
sized and which have 
low levels of debt. 
(Thus, the loan sizes 
are relatively modest, 




• Five-year maturity, rate of LIBOR+300 bps 
(LIBOR is one or three months). 
Origination fee of up to 100 bps.  
• Size limited to between $250,000 and $35 
million, with a limit on total leverage of 4x 
2019 EBITDA. Any outstanding loan has an 
internal risk rating of “pass.” 
• No interest or principal payments in the 
first year. Required minimum amortization 
of 15 percent, 15 percent, and 70 percent 
in years three to five, respectively.  
• Limits on executive compensation, 
dividends, and distributions of capital.  
• Loan not used to voluntarily repay other 
debt.  
• Borrower must make “commercially 
reasonable efforts” to maintain 
employment and payroll. 
• Bank participation five percent. 
• Bank pays SPV 100 bps of principal amount 






in loans to businesses 
that are larger and 
already have 
significant debt. 
(Thus, loan sizes are 
considerably larger, 
and allowable 
leverage is higher 




Same as the New Loan Facility, except: 
• Origination fee of up to 75 bps. 
• Size limited to between $10 million and 
$300 million, with a limit on total leverage 
of 6x 2019 EBITDA.  
• Size also limited to 35 percent of the 
borrower’s debt that is pari passu with the 
participation. 
• Minimum amortization of 15 percent, 15 
percent, and 70 percent in years three to 
five, respectively. 
• Bank participation five percent 
• Bank pays SPV 75 bps of principal and is 





Supporting new loans 
to businesses that are 
small or medium-
sized but may already 
have significant debt. 
(Thus, the loan sizes 
are relatively modest, 
but allowable 
leverage is higher 
than in the New Loan 
Facility.)  
Same as the New Loan Facility, except: 
• Size limited to between $250,000 and $50 
million  
• Limit on total leverage is 6x 2019 EBITDA.  
• The loan can be used to refinance existing 
debt owed to another lender. 
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Finally, the program is designed to limit moral hazard by excluding loans to firms that had 
excessive levels of leverage prior to the pandemic. As noted earlier, the Federal Reserve has 
emphasized for some time that excessive leverage in the nonfinancial business sector is a 
potential risk to the economy because a business downturn caused by other factors could be 
reinforced by a wave of failures and bankruptcies by highly leverage firms. In the interagency 
guidance on leveraged lending in 2013, the federal banking agencies noted that “a leverage 
level after planned asset sales…in excess of 6X Total Debt/EBITDA raises concerns for most 
industries” (Federal Reserve 2013). Thus, it seems appropriate that borrowers under the 
MSLP be required to have a debt to EBITDA ratio of no more than six, even after receiving 
the program loan. The program’s limits on compensation, dividends, and share repurchases 
for borrowers also may serve as an offset to future incentives to increase leverage.  
6. Will the MSLP be successful? 
The success of the MSLP will be measured ultimately by whether more loans are made to 
borrowers in need, with future losses consistent with Federal Reserve and Treasury 
constraints and preferences. Thus, a program with very few loans would not be successful 
since its terms were presumably too restrictive to generate the social benefits of preserving 
firms. However, a program with lots of loans but large losses for the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve would also be a failure, given that the Treasury has indicated a desire to limit losses.  
A. Will borrowers be helped?  
The MSLP makes loans, not government transfers. Not all firms that have lost business 
because of the pandemic will be helped with a loan that increases its total debt burden, 
whereas all firms that receive transfers to cover some of their lost revenue will be helped. 
But loans can be structured so the additional debt is not overly burdensome. In particular, 
loans with longer maturity, lower rates, and deferred payments would make them more 
equity-like. The MSLP loans have a few of these characteristics.  
For all three programs, the loans are five-year maturity, with interest payments deferred for 
the first year. Principal payments are deferred for two years, and the bulk of the 
repayments—70 percent—come only in the final year. These terms are helpful because they 
allow the firm more time for recovery. Indeed, the Federal Reserve recognized potential 
benefits to borrowers of more “equity-like” features when it lengthened maturities and 
pushed back amortization to the current periods in changes announced on June 8 (Federal 
Reserve 2020c).24 
However, the loan rate of three-month LIBOR+300 basis points is the same for the three 
programs, despite significant variation in minimum loan sizes and maximum leverage ratios. 
A common spread is not consistent with market practices and appears expensive for lower-
risk borrowers. In particular, spread data on C&I loans by commercial banks and on 
institutional leveraged loans available for transactions in mid-2017 (the latest data available 
from the Fed’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending, or STBL) suggest substantial variation 
 
24 The originally proposed maturity of the loans was four years, with one year of deferred interest and principal 
payments. 
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across size and credit rating (Table 5). For C&I loans by large domestic banks, with an 
average size of $593,000 and a risk rating of 3.1, the average spread in mid-2017 was 2.13 
percent (a rate of 3.43 percent).25 The spread for low-risk loans was lower, 1.61 percent, and 
for loans below $1 million, 2.50 percent. All of these spreads are lower than the 300 basis 
points for the Main Street program. At their previous recession peak in 2010 following the 
financial crisis, C&I loan spreads reached 3.17 percent, and were above 300 basis points for 
moderate risk loans and smaller loans.26 These data suggest that a 300 bp spread is much 
closer to a peak recession spread than a spread in more normal times and is high for low-
risk, and even moderate-risk, firms, except at their cyclical peak, suggesting the program will 
not attract higher-quality borrowers. This pricing is unlike the more favorable terms offered 
to investment-grade corporations, where the PMCCF will purchase new issues at market 
rates, and the SMCCF purchases bond ETFs or single-name bonds in order to reduce risk 
spreads on outstanding bonds, which then should reduce the rate on bonds purchased in the 
PMCCF.  
Table 5. Spreads on C&I loans and institutional leveraged loans, by risk and size, 2010 






Average C&I loan  
 2010 loan size $447,000, Risk rating 3.2 






Risk   
 Low 2.47 1.61 
 Moderate 3.24 2.18 
Size ($Thousands)   
 100 to 1,000 3.60 2.50 
 1,000 to 10,000 2.95 2.07 
   
Institutional leveraged loans   
  BB/BB- rating 4.00 2.50 
  B+/B rating  5.50 4.00 
Source: For C&I loans, large domestic banks, Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, Federal Reserve 
Board. For institutional leveraged loans, S&P Global, Leveraged Commentary & Data, as 
reported in the Federal Reserve Board Financial Stability Reports. Spreads are relative to three-
month LIBOR. 
 
25 The category “moderate risk” represents the average loan under average economic conditions at the typical 
lender. The risk rating is calculated by assigning a value of 1 to minimal risk loans, 2 to low risk loans, 3 to 
moderate risk loans, 4 to acceptable risk loans, and 5 to special mention and classified loans. 
26 The STBL was discontinued in May 2017. A new survey was started for small business loans—Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2020). However, the loans covered in that survey are much smaller than those 
that had been included in the STBL. For example, the average C&I loan offered by domestic commercial banks 
in the STBL in the May 2017 survey was $491,000, while the average loan size in 2017:Q4 in the new survey 
for a new fixed-term loan was $93,000 and for a new variable-term loan was $160,000. Loan spreads on new 
fixed-term loans ranged from 3.2 to 3.9 percent between 2017:Q4 and 2019:Q4, reflecting their smaller size. 
No information is available in the new survey on the risk of the loans. 
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Note that spreads on institutional leveraged loans for below-investment-grade borrowers 
ranged on average from 250 basis points to 400 basis points, and this range would 
encompass the 300-basis-point spread for borrowers under the Expanded or Priority 
facilities. But again, the range is fairly large, suggesting that a common spread would be a 
disincentive for higher quality borrowers within this group to borrow from the program.  
In short, the LIBOR+300 basis points spread on MSLP loans would not be attractive to less-
leveraged middle-market firms that access credit mainly through banks. Rather, it appears 
attractive mainly for higher-risk borrowers and smaller loans. We believe that a bank with 
an existing customer that met the conservative debt limits under the New Loan Facility 
would find this spread to be high, and so would be willing to make a loan at this spread and 
keep it on its own books, suggesting that a narrower loan spread may be called for to support 
business borrowing and the continued operation of small-to-mid-sized businesses. 
The leverage restrictions limit access by two types of borrowers. First, there are some 
smaller, high growth prospect firms with limited debt but also limited revenues. Such firms 
would exceed the 6x EBITDA constraint, but also would benefit more from an equity-like 
contract, such as a loan with an ability to extend the maturity. Second, there are firms that 
exceed the leverage constraint because they have issued substantial amounts of debt, and 
the program may want to exclude them for moral hazard or reputation risk reasons. That 
said, such firms may be significant employers, and their bankruptcy could be inefficient. In 
such cases, the Fed could establish a process to allow banks to make exceptions to the general 
underwriting guidance and lend to such firms under the program, so long as the bank agreed 
to retain a larger share of the loan, such as 15 or 20 percent, in order to ensure that the bank 
was comfortable with the credit. Indeed, when the Priority Loan facility was introduced in 
April, it allowed higher leverage than the New Loan facility in return for a higher bank 
participation share. This tradeoff was eliminated in the revised terms issued in June. But 
policymakers should monitor closely whether the program could be more effective in 
serving the needs of borrowers and the economy if higher leverage could be accommodated. 
If so, the higher leverage should be accompanied by an increase in bank retention share to 
limit risk, and moral hazard concerns could be mitigated by the limits on dividends, 
buybacks, and compensation.  
Some prospective borrowers may also be concerned about the stigma associated with taking 
a government-supported loan when it is not designed to be used broadly and offered on 
favorable terms. In addition, the restriction on retaining employees may hinder the ability of 
borrowing firms to make necessary adjustments to their business practices to remain viable 
in a post-COVID environment, and thus limit demand. Moreover, lack of clarity about how 
compliance with this requirement will be measured could make borrowers less willing to 
use the program. 
B. Will banks participate given the terms that have been established?  
We outlined above three ways to incentivize banks to lend more, by a funding for lending 
subsidy, a guarantee, and a participation such as in the MSLP. The ability to sell 95 percent 
of the loan to the SPV should help if the main impediment to lending to the intended 
beneficiaries is balance-sheet capacity. If the main impediment to bank lending is limited risk 
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appetite, however, rather than balance-sheet pressures, it isn’t clear that the MSLP will get 
much use because the bank needs to retain some of the loan, and even if only five percent, it 
will apply its own underwriting standards to the loan.  
Which is it? Banks’ responses to the July 2020 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey show that 
70 percent of domestic banks surveyed, on net, had tightened lending standards for firms of 
all sizes (Figure 2 above). Moreover, they indicated that reduced tolerance for risk was a 
more important factor than a bank’s current or expected capital position. In particular, the 
survey shows that banks attributed the changes to increased uncertainty about the outlook, 
a worsening of industry-specific problems, and a reduced tolerance for risk. Only relatively 
few banks indicated that a deterioration in their bank’s current or expected capital position 
had played a significant role.27  
Thus, the current program, which is more effective in addressing balance-sheet constraints 
than concerns about loan risk, may not give enough encouragement to banks to participate. 
However, while banks may want to avoid lending to riskier firms on their own, the fees on 
MSLP loans should make them more willing to do so. For example, under the New and 
Priority Loan Facilities, banks extend only five percent of the loan, but they receive an 
origination fee of up to 100 basis points of the loan, and then a servicing fee of 25 basis points 
of the remaining 95 percent of the loan each year. Thus, the total fees paid to the banks are 
more than 40 percent of the portion of the loan that the banks retain—a significant incentive 
to lend to firms that may benefit from the credit but are not strong enough to obtain loans 
directly from the bank. 
Banks also may be less willing to participate if there is uncertainty about the costs associated 
with workouts of loans to defaulting borrowers. The program requires that the banks, which 
have considerable experience in managing troubled loans, will be responsible for any 
workouts. Thus, in evaluating participation in the program, banks will need to take account 
of the likely costs they will incur in the case of loan defaults. One problem with this approach, 
however, is that banks may view the workouts as too burdensome, or they may be concerned 
that in situations where loan losses are high, they will face large workout costs that they will 
find hard to manage. In such situations, banks also may face funding pressures and so may 
be inclined to limit workout costs by moving quickly to close defaulting firms. By contrast, 
the Fed and Treasury do not face funding pressures, and they can take account of the social 
benefits to keeping firms going during the recovery and avoiding liquidations—hence they 
would be inclined to be more flexible in workouts. To encourage the banks in this regard, the 
Fed and Treasury could pay higher servicing fees for delinquent loans, particularly in periods 
of generally high loan delinquencies, which would encourage more loan originations and 
more efficient workouts.28  
 
27 Of course, banks may be wary of reporting concerns about their capital positions on a Federal Reserve 
survey—even in the global financial crisis, when many banks faced severe capital pressures, survey 
respondents pointed primarily to higher risk and decreased risk tolerance as the reasons for tighter lending 
standards. 
28 An alternative approach would be to use the SPV or a separate “resolution” SPV to manage the troubled loans 
on behalf of the Federal Reserve and Treasury and enter into loss-sharing arrangements with the banks. This 
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7. How to make the MSLP more effective 
The design of the MSLP is challenging since it is a new program being introduced in an 
entirely novel situation. The Fed has already made two sets of adjustments to the original 
proposal based on more than 2,200 comment letters and other feedback from potential 
borrowers and lenders. Nonetheless, at least thus far, the Main Street program has not gotten 
significant use. One obvious possibility is that the intended firms have not—at least yet—
chosen to borrow to address the slowdown caused by the coronavirus. It is hard to 
disentangle whether such choices reflect unattractive loan terms or simply a limited need to 
borrow at this stage. As we have noted, some businesses may have resources to draw on 
before they need to borrow, and other businesses may need capital rather than loans. That 
said, a survey by Bartik, et al (2020) of 5,800 small businesses during the week of March 28 
to April 4, 2020, suggests that there may be significant demand for loans if the terms are 
attractive enough. In particular, when offered a loan with a portion that could be forgiven, 
similar to the loans provided under the PPP program, 72 percent of surveyed businesses said 
that they would be interested. And even when offered a similar loan but without any 
possibility of forgiveness, a majority of businesses (59 percent) still indicated that they 
would be interested.  
Since there is likely to be a demand for credit by some of the targeted firms, we believe the 
program’s limited use reflects terms and conditions that are not sufficiently attractive for 
either lending banks or firms. To address these possibilities, we recommend that the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury consider three types of changes to the program.  
First, use of the MSLP may be limited because banks do not find that the participation 
structure effectively addresses the problems posed by the risk of new loans. Instead it 
addresses balance-sheet constraints, which banks indicate are not currently binding. To 
make banks more willing to participate:  
• The government should increase program fees, giving banks a larger part of the 
spread on the entire loan, to provide greater compensation for the risk that banks 
retain. The government could even pay a higher fee to banks that do more lending 
under the program; this additional incentive for greater program use would be 
similar in spirit to the approach taken to reward lenders for more SME lending in 
the Bank of England’s term funding scheme.  
• To address possible concerns about the costs associated with a higher than usual 
level of loan workouts, the program could also pay higher servicing fees for 
delinquent loans, particularly in periods of generally high loan delinquencies, in 
 
approach would help to align the incentives of those conducting the workout with the interests of the Federal 
Reserve and Treasury, and so could lead to better outcomes. Allowing for troubled loans to be pooled across 
the program also could increase returns, particularly if the troubled loans were ultimately securitized and sold. 
Hiring asset managers with skills in working out troubled credits could free the Fed and Treasury from those 
responsibilities, which require specialized skills and could be politically fraught. And, while it would take some 
time to contract with appropriate asset managers, there likely would be time because program loans do not 
require payments in the near term.   
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order to encourage banks to do loan workouts that are more efficient than those 
that only minimize the banks’ short-term costs.  
Second, since the set of firms that could benefit from the MSLP varies widely, from small 
private borrowers that have limited debt to very large, complex companies with significant 
debt, the terms of the program should be more flexible, allowing the loans to be better 
tailored to the risks and needs of the borrowers. Specifically:  
• The terms for the New Loan facility should be eased relative to those for the 
Priority and Extended facilities, since the smaller firms that could borrow under 
the New Loan facility are likely simpler and less risky because of their lower 
leverage, and have fewer alternatives to avoid liquidation or inefficient 
bankruptcies. Thus, loan spreads for such borrowers should be recalibrated to 
reflect differences in credit quality across the three loan facilities.  
• The minimum loan size for the New Loan and Priority Loan Facilities is $250,000. 
If the Fed and Treasury find that there are many small firms that either cannot 
access the PPP program or require additional support, they should reduce the 
minimum loan size further. Such a change could also encourage smaller banks to 
participate in the program. The social costs of small business failures are high and 
could delay a recovery.   
• The paperwork required for loans in the New Loan facility should be streamlined. 
Currently the borrower and lender certification requirements appear to reflect 
participation by large banks and large, complicated firms, which have the legal 
staff needed to comply with them. However, the smaller banks and simpler 
borrowers that might use the New Loan facility will likely find these certifications 
daunting.  
• To prevent a hard deadline for debt repayment from causing the failure of firms 
that may need more time to reorganize and survive, particularly in the event of a 
protracted post-coronavirus recession, MSLP loans should have longer maturities 
and more delayed repayments of principal, but with incentives for firms to repay 
earlier if possible. Under the terms of the PMCCF, investment-grade and fallen 
angel firms can obtain credit for a five-year term with repayment only at maturity, 
so five-year loans with some amortization under the Main Street program seem 
less favorable to the borrowers. Another possible comparison is to SBA 7(a) loans, 
which can be extended for up to ten years.  
• Maximum debt-to-EBITDA ratios have been set for each of the facilities, which 
helps to address adverse selection, targeting, and moral hazard concerns. 
However, there may be situations where borrowers exceed the limits, but banks 
believe that such lending would benefit the borrower and the economy. The 
current program does not allow for this type of flexibility, but policymakers could 
allow it in some situations, while requiring banks to retain a larger fraction of such 
loans to demonstrate their confidence in the credit and provide the Federal 
Reserve and Treasury with adequate protection.  
Finally, the restrictions on borrowers under the program could be adjusted to reduce the 
stigma associated with the program and to allow borrowing firms to restructure their 
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operations in light of new supplier and customer behaviors in a post-COVID-19 economy. In 
particular: 
• The Fed and Treasury should quickly clarify how the requirement that borrowers 
make “commercially reasonable” efforts to maintain employment will be 
assessed. Providing more clarity on what adjustments would be deemed 
reasonable would reduce uncertainty for businesses considering an MSLP loan 
and so encourage take-up. More broadly, if the dividend, compensation, and 
employment requirements imposed on borrowers are not legally required under 
the CARES Act, policymakers should consider whether they are appropriate or 
could be eased to encourage program use.  
Of course, adopting some of these recommendations could worsen the adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems the program is designed to address, and they would also require the 
government to accept an increased risk of loss. However, since some of the other 13(3) 
programs (PDCF, CPFF, MMLF) are likely to make money, the Treasury could use gains on 
other programs to offset the risk of losses on the MSLP. The mutualization of the gains and 
losses across programs would effectively provide some room to increase the attractiveness 
of the MSLP. The Fed and the Treasury thus far have responded aggressively to reduce the 
harm of the coronavirus on the economy, but they may need to be even more aggressive to 
help small-to-mid-sized businesses that cannot access the PPP. 
Policymakers also should be prepared to quickly turn to alternative approaches if a modified 
MSLP program still is not effective. Without changes to the CARES Act, the Federal Reserve 
could introduce a funding for lending program to reduce bank funding costs and encourage 
lending. This program could be done under the Fed’s existing authority in the Federal 
Reserve Act. While such a program might not have a large effect, it would be relatively low 
cost and, by leaving the loans on banks’ balance sheets, it would avoid many of the possible 
information and incentive problems associated with the MSLP.  
There are more options if changes can be made to the CARES Act. For example, Congress 
could authorize a loan guarantee program to increase banks’ willingness to lend despite a 
limited risk appetite. Such a program could be structured like an expanded SBA 7(a) 
program, and it would be similar to the programs that have been introduced in some other 
countries. Alternatively, Congress could allow the Federal Reserve or the Treasury to 
purchase preferred stock, or even common equity, which would avoid the problems 
associated with debt overhang, and so allow support to be provided to many more firms. 
Finally, Congress could lift the prohibition on loan forgiveness contained in the CARES Act, 
allowing the Fed and Treasury to forgive loans if the effects of the coronavirus on borrowers 
turn out to be significantly larger than anticipated. Such forgiveness would effectively 
provide insurance against future shutdowns caused by the coronavirus and could support 
both banks’ willingness to lend and firms’ willingness to borrow.29  
  
 
29 Metrick (2020) outlines a possible structure for such a program.  
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Table A1: Summary of U.K. COVID-19 Business Credit Support Programs 
 
Source of Support Type of Support Eligibility Terms 




(SMEs are defined as a 
business with fewer 
than 250 employees 
and either (a) a 
turnover of less than 
£44.45m or (b) a 
balance sheet of less 
than £38.22m.) 
100 percent 
guarantee of loans of 
£2000 to the lesser of 
25 percent of business 
turnover or £50,000. 
Loan term of six years, 
loan interest rate of 
2.5 percent.  
No fees and no 
payments for a year. 
Government pays 
interest for the first 
year. 





(SMEs are defined as a 
business with fewer 
than 250 employees 
and either (a) a 
turnover of fewer 
than £44.45m or (b) a 
balance sheet of fewer 
than £38.22m.) 
80 percent guarantee 
of loans over £50,000 
and up to £5 million. 
No interest and fees 
for the first year. 
British Business Bank 
Large Business 
Interruption Loans 
Guarantee Larger firms with 
turnover greater than 
£44.45 million. 
80 percent guarantee 
of loans up to £25 
million for firms with 
turnover from £44.45 
million to £250 
million and up to £50 
million for those with 
turnover above £250 
million. 
Term of up to three 
years. 
No interest and fees 
for the first year. 
British Government 
Future Fund 
Convertible loan Newer, faster growing 
firms. 





Interest rate of eight 
percent for a 
maximum of three 
years. 
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Converts to equity at 
the next funding 
round of the firm with 
a 20 percent discount. 
Bank of England 
COVID Corporate 
Finance Facility 
(Joint program of the 





Firms that were 
investment grade 
prior to the crisis. 
Terms comparable to 
those in the market 
prior to the crisis. 
Maturity of up to a 
year. 
Minimum purchase is 
£1 million. Maximum 
total purchase is £1 
billion for large, 
highly rated firms.  
Bank of England 
Term Funding Scheme 
with additional 







Floating rate funding 
with a four-year term.  
Priced at Bank Rate, 
unless lending to 
British businesses and 
households declines, 
in which case it 
increases by as much 
as 25 bps. 
Quantity of low-cost 
funding depends on 
the level of lending to 
businesses and 
households in the UK, 
plus increases in such 
lending over a base 
period. Increases in 
lending to SMEs get a 
multiple of five in the 
calculation.  
 
Sources: British Business Bank (2020a), British Business Bank (2020b), Bank of England (2020a), 
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Table A2: Summary of German COVID-19 Business Credit Support Programs 
 
Source of Support Type of Support Eligibility Terms 
KfW Instant Loan 
(KfW backed by the 
German Government) 
Guarantee of loan for 
investment or 
operating costs. 
(Loan can’t be used to 
pay off other loans or 
to invest in other 
firms.) 
German firms with 
more than 10 
employees and 
positive profit in 2019 
or on average over 
2017-19. 
Firms not in troubled 
condition at the end of 
2019. 
100 percent 
guarantee of a loan of 
up to the lesser of 
€500,000 and 25 
percent of 2019 
turnover for firms 
with up to 50 
employees, and the 
lesser of €800,000 
and 25 percent of 
2019 turnover for 
firms with more than 
50 employees.  
Term is up to 10 years. 
Fixed rate, currently 
3.0 percent. 
No underwriting by 
the bank. 





KfW Startup Loan— 
Universal 
Guarantee of loan for 
investment or 
operating costs. 
(Loan can’t be used to 
pay off other loans or 
to invest in other 
firms.) 
German firms in 
existence for three-to-
five years. 
Firms not in troubled 
condition at the end of 
2019. 
 
(SMEs are firms with 
fewer than 250 
employees and 
turnover of less than 
€50 million OR assets 
of less than €43 
million.) 
 
Guarantee of 90 
percent of loans for 
SMEs and 80 percent 
of loans for larger 
firms.  
Maximum loan size of 
€1 billion (with other 
limits based on annual 
turnover, wage costs, 
debt, and financing 
needs).  
Term of up to 10 years.  
Fixed Rate, currently 
2.0 to 2.12 percent. 







Guarantee of loan for 
investment or 
operating costs. 
Firms operating in 
Germany in existence 
for more than five 
years. 
Guarantee of 90 
percent of loans for 
SMEs and 80 percent 
of loans for larger 
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(Loan can’t be used to 
pay off other loans or 




Firms not in troubled 
condition at the end of 
2019. 
 
(SMEs are firms with 
fewer than 250 
employees and 
turnover of less than 
€50 million OR assets 
of less than €43 
million.) 
 
firms. Maximum loan 
size of €1 billion (with 
other limits based on 
annual turnover, wage 
costs, total debt, and 
financing needs).  
Term of up to 10 
years.  
Rate is based on risk. 
Current range is from 
1.03 to 7.43 percent. 





KfW Syndicate Loans Participation in loan 
for investment and 
operating costs. 
Firms operating in 
Germany with 50 or 
more employees. 
Firm can’t be in 
default, and the bank 
must state that the 
firm can repay the 
loan. 
KfW provides up to 80 
percent of the loan, 
with a limit of 50 
percent of the total 
debt of the firm. 
Minimum size of €25 
million, with limits on 
size.  
Maturity of up to six 
years.  
Rate and other terms 
are the same as for 
the private lenders. 








Debt guarantees for up 
to 60 months 
Troubled German 
firms that are two of: 
Assets over €43 
million, revenues over 
€50 million, and 250 
or more employees; 
and have experienced 
financial hardship as a 
result of COVID-19. 
Total guarantees of up 




Purchases of capital 
instruments 
Troubled German 
firms that are two of: 
Assets over €43 
million, revenues over 
€50 million, and 250 
or more employees; 
and have experienced 
Total investments of 
up to €100 billion. 
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Note: The German government and the state governments also have programs to provide support to 
firms.  





financial hardship as a 
result of COVID-19. 
There must be an 
important interest of 
the federal 
government in the 







Low-cost funding Euro area banks Full allotment 
operations providing 
liquidity at a rate 25 
bps below the rate on 
Main Refinancing 





Low-cost funding Euro area banks Rate on TLTRO III 
operations can be as 
low as -100 bps 
through March 2021. 
Banks will receive this 
low rate if their loans 
do not decline over 
the year.  
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